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DEBT VALUATION AND CHAPTER 22
Abstract
Numerous studies have examined the effect on credit spreads of renegotia-
tion. These studies have generally focussed on the impact on spread levels in
general, and not on how renegotiation influences the relative pricing of senior
versus junior debt claims. In this paper, we show that the scope for sequential
renegotiation may reduce and even eliminate the premium for debt seniority.
Our analysis also explains why companies may engage in repeated Chapter 11
bankruptcy filings (a phenomenon commonly referred to as Chapter 22).
Keywords: real options, bankruptcy, debt service, absolute priority, bar-
gaining (JEL: G13, G33, G34)
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Introduction
Influential studies by Franks and Torous (1989), (1994) and Asquith, Gertner and
Scharfstein (1990) demonstrated, by detailed analysis of the experience of distressed
companies, how the renegotiation of debt claims, either in formal bankruptcy pro-
ceedings like Chapter 11 or in restructurings outside formal bankruptcy, may lead to
deviations from absolute priority.
These insights stimulated a series of theoretical papers studying how credit spreads
are affected when equity-holders can (i) make take-it-or-leave-it offers to reduce the
contractually agreed coupon (Anderson and Sundaresan (1997), Mella-Barral and
Perraudin (1998)), (ii) make take-it-or-leave-it offers to write off debt principal (Mella-
Barral (1998)), or (iii) bargain on the coupon (Fan and Sundaresan (2000)).1 All of
these papers focuss on conflicts of interest between equity- and debt-holders and
resulting Absolute Priority Violations (APV) that benefit equity-holders.
Recent evidence suggests that conflicts of interest between different debtor classes
may have become relatively more important. In particular, there seems to have been
a ‘secular decline’ in the frequency of equity-related APV. Bharath, Panchapegesan
and Werner (2007) find the frequency of APV in favor of equity holders has declined
from 22% in the period 1991− 2005 to 9% during 2000− 2005. Also Bris, Welch and
Zhu (2006) find fewer APR violations (12%) compared to earlier studies (their dataset
includes Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 cases during the period 1995− 2001). The same
figure on APV (12%) is found in Ayotte and Morrison (2009). At the same time, the
1Our paper is a contribution to a large literature in which the pricing implications of different
types of strategic behavior by parties to debt contracts are examined. Relevant studies apart from
those already mentioned include Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996), Hege and Mella-Barral
(2000), Lambrecht (2001), Hege and Mella-Barral (2005), Acharya, Huang, Subrahmanyam, and
Sundaram (2006), Hennessy, Hackbarth and Leland (2007), Broadie, Chernov and Sundaresan (2007)
and Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007).
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output of restructuring seems to be more and more driven by conflicts amongst senior
and junior creditors rather than creditors versus equity holders (again, see Ayotte and
Morrison (2009)).
In this paper, we provide a theoretical analysis of debt-holder conflicts and how
they affect valuation and restructuring within a regime that allows for Chapter 11
bankruptcies. We show how the possibility of renegotiating the claims of different
classes of debt sequentially may: (i) limit the effectiveness of seniority provisions by
excluding senior creditors from renegotiations, (ii) reverse the relative positions of
senior and junior debt-holders, even leading to situations in which the credit spreads
on senior debt exceed those on junior debt issued by the same firm and (iii) still lead
to cases of APV when the equity holders have sufficient bargaining power.
In modeling bankruptcy, we aim to match the main features of the Chapter 11 of
the US Bankruptcy Code. We follow Brown (1989) who emphasizes that in a Chapter
11 filing those claim-holders left ‘unimpaired’ by a plan lose their veto power. These
provisions greatly enhance the equity-holders’ strategic behavior in bankruptcy in
that they may renegotiate with one creditor at a time in a ‘private renegotiation’
while excluding unimpaired creditors.
This possibility has strong empirical support. LoPucki and Whitford (1993) and
LoPucki (2004) find that senior secured classes are typically left unimpaired or, when
impaired, the impairment involves all classes. In the dataset used by LoPucki and
Whitford (1993) we could analyse the treatment of each class for 31 Chapter 11
cases. Out of 31 cases, in 19 cases, at least one creditor’s class was unimpaired, most
frequently a secured class.
The framework we employ is a model of a levered firm with two classes of perpetual
debt. In bankruptcy, equity-holders may sequentially bargain with holders of the two
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debt classes. Our analysis yields a unique equilibrium, the nature of which depends
on the parameters of the problem, but in which firms restructure their debt twice.
This pattern of restructuring thresholds explains why companies emerging from
bankruptcy often re-enter Chapter 11 within a few years, a phenomenon commonly
referred to as “Chapter 22”. According to Gilson (1997) and Hotchkiss (1995) re-
spectively, 25 percent and 32 percent of firms file for bankruptcy or restructure their
debts a second time. LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Research Database (BRD) shows that
companies emerging from Chapter 11 (between 2000− 2005) refiled within 5 years in
25.23% of the cases.
This puzzling empirical regularity has been attributed to different factors. Hotchkiss
(1995) links Chapter 22 to inefficiencies in the Bankruptcy Code while Aggarval (1995)
suggests as explanation inefficiencies in renegotiation due to coordination problems.
Kahl (2002) attributes Chapter 22 to incomplete information, suggesting the firm’s
viability is imperfectly known at the first bankruptcy and that a second restructuring
helps creditors to make better informed decisions.
Unlike these authors, our explanation of the Chapter 22 phenomenon relies on
structural aspects of Chapter 11. In line with Brown (1989), who recognizes the
importance of veto power in restructuring, our first restructuring is filed by the equity
holders in a strategic fashion. When bankruptcy occurs a second time, the firm value
is lower, reducing the liquidation threat of ‘strong’ creditors who will then make more
concessions.
In particular, for reasonable levels of bankruptcy costs (not excessively high) and
junior debt face value (not negligibly small), the senior debt will be unimpaired at
the first bankruptcy threshold and will be restructured only if the firm value falls
sufficiently, triggering a second bankruptcy proceeding. As mentioned, such equilibria
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are rather common in Chapter 11 reorganizations where, typically, senior secured
classes are left unimpaired or, when impaired, the impairment involves all classes (see
LoPucki and Whitford (1993) and LoPucki (2004)).
Furthermore, such equilibria may entail greater deviations from Absolute Priority.
The intuitive explanation is that renegotiation with the senior creditor is delayed until
the firm value is low and hence seniority provisions are less valuable.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I described features of Chapter 11 that
we aim to capture in our formal modeling. Section II describes the model. Section
III looks at implications for credit spreads. Section IV concludes.
I Key Features of Chapter 11
In this section, we set out important aspects of Chapter 11 that have the potential to
influence the allocation of value among securities holders. An alternative, exhaustive
discussion of the Chapter 11 rules is provided by Kordana and Posner (1999).
1. Timing of bankruptcy. The timing of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy is generally
determined by equity-holders who in almost all cases initiate the process. Chap-
ter 11 allows for involuntary bankruptcy too. However, the Court will dismiss
a creditors’s bankruptcy petition if the debtor has not failed to pay its debts
when due.2
2. First proposal. Equity-holders have the exclusive right to propose a first
reorganization plan.3 The shareholders’ right of first proposal lasts 120 days
(plus 60 days for securing acceptance of the plan) and can be extended by the
2Bankruptcy Code, Section 303, Paragraph (h)(1).
3Bankruptcy Code, Section 1121.
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Court. The debtors’ ability to extend the exclusivity period has been generally
used as leverage in the negotiating process. Under the 2005 Act,4 the exclusivity
period cannot be extended beyond a maximum of 18 months.5
3. Acceptance of plan. A plan must be approved by each impaired class (for
these purposes, equity-holders are considered to be always impaired), with ap-
proval by at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in number within
each class.6
4. Impairment rules. A creditor cannot reject a plan if he or she receives cash
equal to the face value of his or her claim or if the plan calls for no scaling
down of the coupon payment scheduled in the existing contract. In this case,
the creditor is said to be unimpaired7 by the plan and loses veto power.8 The
‘impairment’ rule allows equity holders to negotiate with one creditor at a time.
5. Cram down. Chapter 11 allows for confirmation by the Court of non-consensual
plans –so called ‘crammed-down’ plans. That is, at the request of the plan’s
proponent, the Court may confirm a plan in spite of rejection by some impaired
class as long as: i) at least one impaired class has accepted the plan and ii) im-
paired rejecting classes receive at least what they would receive in a Chapter 7
liquidation.9 As reported by Lopucki and Whitford (1990), restructuring rarely
4The Bankruptcy Code has been amended a number of times, with most recent amendments set
out with “The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005” (shortly, the
2005 Act) effective since October 17, 2005.
5Bankruptcy Code, Section 1121, Paragraph (d)(2).
6Bankruptcy Code, Section 1126 Paragraph (c)
7Bankruptcy Code, Section 1124(1).“A class of claims or interests is impaired under a plan unless,
with respect to each claim or interest of such class, the plan leaves unaltered the legal, equitable,
and contractual rights to which such claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest”.
8Bankruptcy Code, Section 1126.
9Bankruptcy Code, Section 1129, Paragraph (b)(1)).
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involves non-consensual plans, however.10
6. Subsequent proposals. There are no specific agenda rules concerning subse-
quent proposals in the bankruptcy code. Once the equity holders’ proposal has
been rejected, the rules become unbiased towards different players. In Chapter
11, when multiple plans are filed and accepted by the voting classes, the Court
shall decide which plan to confirm on the grounds of ‘the preferences of credi-
tors and equity security holders’.11 A certain degree of discretion is granted at
this stage and the outcome of the negotiation may depend on the ability of the
players to propose reorganization plans and influence the court.
7. Liquidation. If no agreement is reached the case is converted into Chapter 7
and the company is liquidated. In Chapter 7, APR is always followed. In a study
by Bris, Welch and Zhu (2006) in about half of their Chapter 7 liquidations (30
cases), secured creditors receive nothing and unsecured creditors receive nothing
in 95% of the cases.12
10In a sample of 43 Chapter 11 reorganizations, they find that in no case was a plan confirmed
without approval of all debt classes. Not even seems cram-down to be a strategic threat to speed up
acceptance of a plan. According to Lopucki and Whitford (1990), bankruptcy practitioners would
rarely suggest a cram-down strategy. Rather than for strategic reason, they argue that cram-down is
accounted for in Chapter 11 because when a class receives nothing under a plan, that class is deemed
to reject –even if no actual disagreement arises– and no vote is cast for that class (Bankruptcy Code,
Section 1126, Paragraph (g)). Thus cram-down is an expedient to avoid non-confirmation of plans
which are unanimously agreed on.
11Bankruptcy Code, Section 1129, Paragraph (c).
12Their study reports APV in Chapter 11 but not in Chapter 7 because, as they state, in Chapter
7 APR is always followed.
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II The Model
A The Form of the Game
Before describing our assumptions and model mathematically, it may assist the reader
if we describe the basic form of the game we formulate. Recall that Chapter 11 rules
imply that, in an initial period, equity-holders make an offer which is adopted if it is
accepted by every impaired class. If an impaired class rejects the offer, any class may
file a plan. If no plan is accepted, the firm is liquidated and claim-holders are paid
using the proceeds.
In our game theoretic representation of Chapter 11, equity-holders make a take-
it-or-leave it offer to creditors of a reduction in debt service. If creditors reject this,
cooperative bargaining ensues in which any party may propose a plan. If agreement
is not reached in the cooperative bargaining, the firm experiences a value-reducing
transfer of ownership and the stake-holders are paid in strict order of priority. Figure
1 shows the extensive form representation of the game between different stake-holder
groups.
As we demonstrate below, there is a unique equilibrium in our game in which the
equity-holders’ offer is accepted. This offer effectively allocates value between stake-
holders in a way that is influenced by the cooperative bargaining that occurs if the
offer is rejected and the cooperative bargaining allocation is itself influenced by the
payoffs that stake-holders would obtain if the firm were liquidated through scrapping
or value-reducing transfer of ownership.
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B Assumptions
Our basic modeling assumptions are as follows.
Assumption 1
1. Agents are risk neutral and may freely borrow and lend at a constant interest
rate, r.
2. The firm consists of a claim to a cash flow process, pt, which follows a geometric
Brownian motion:
dpt = µptdt+ σptdWt .
3. The firm has issued two classes of perpetual debt consisting of: a senior class
paying a coupon bs and with a face value of Fs = bs/r and a junior class paying
bj with face value Fj = bj/r. We also assume that
13 Fs > γ.
4. At any time, the firm may be scrapped through a piecemeal liquidation that yields
a monetary amount γ.
Let Vt denote the total firm value. Our model contains no frictions and hence the
sum of claim values will always equal total firm value. We abstract from frictions
because our focus is on how renegotiation affects the split of value between different
claim-holders. Standard arguments imply:
V (pt, p) =
pt
r − µ +
(
γ − p
r − µ
)(
pt
p
)λ
(1)
where λ =
−(µ− σ2/2)−√(µ− σ2/2)2 + 2σ2r
σ2
,
13If Fs ≤ γ the senior creditor is fully secured at any level of the cash flow pt and the senior creditor
will never be restructured in bankruptcy. This assumption allows us to focus on cases where also
the senior creditor is restructured in bankruptcy (see footnote in Proposition 1).
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where p is a trigger level at which the firm is scrapped. The total value of the firm is
maximized if the firm is scrapped when pt first hits the trigger level:
p =
λ
λ− 1γ(r − µ). (2)
In some circumstances, we will consider cases in which the the firm is sold as a going
concern prior to a piecemeal liquidation or scrapping. In this case, we suppose that
new equity-holders operate the firm on a pure equity basis without issuing new debt.
The sale price available through such a “going-concern disposal,” denoted VL(pt), is
assumed to equal:
VL(pt) = αV (pt) + (1− α)γ . (3)
The assumption that liquidation occurs via such a sale of assets is in the spirit of
Mella-Barral (1999). The difference V (pt) − VL(pt) captures the implicit cost of a
transfer-of-ownership liquidation. The reason is that a liquidation sale might involve
a partial dismantlement of the technology, with, for instance, possible “loss of human
capital, know-how, and competitive edge,” Mella-Barral (1999). Furthermore, the
above specification resembles that of Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996)14 and
equals their formulation when the scrapping value, γ, equals zero. It is also in line with
Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) in that the value obtained when ownership changes
is always below the maximum firm value V (pt) but never below the scrapping value
of the firm. Their bankruptcy costs become zero as the state variable, pt, approaches
the optimal shutting down trigger, which is also true in our case.15
14Their formulation is VL = αV in our notation.
15The difference V (pt) − VL(pt) = (1 − α)(V (pt) − γ), which may be thought of as bankruptcy
costs, converges to zero when pt tends to the optimal shutting down trigger p.
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Note that, in the game we formulate below, value-reducing transfers of ownership
of the type just described only occur along “off-equilibrium” paths. Hence, while they
influence the allocation of value through affecting the “outside offers” that creditors
obtain if bargaining breaks down, they do not influence total firm value.
Our assumptions regarding bankruptcy may be listed as:
Assumption 2
1. Equity-holders precipitate bankruptcy16 by ceasing to meet operating losses, in-
cluding coupon payments, by further equity injections.17
2. For simplicity, we treat each class of claimants as a single agent. This precludes
holdout problems.
3. Filing a plan is costless.18
4. A restructuring plan consists of:
(i) An allocation of value V (pt) for each claim-holder group for each level of
the state variable. It is implemented by a set of variable instantaneous
coupon payment functions bi(pt) ≤ bi with i = s, j. The letters ‘s’ and ‘j’
denote the senior and junior claim-holder respectively. The coupon pay-
ment functions are consistent with the value allocations.19
16We abstract from agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. See Lambrecht and
Myers (2008) for an analysis of default decision with rent maximizing managers. However, their
study focusses on optimal capital structure with one layer of (safe or risky) debt, while ours focusses
on pricing two layers of debt with exogenous capital structure.
17Over the period 2000-2010, 97.23% of large, public company bankruptcy cases which have been
confirmed were voluntary cases (see LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Research Dataset). Also, the assumption
that firms enter bankruptcy voluntarily follows the approach of many recent studies including Leland
(1994) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997).
18One could in principle introduce exogenous costs for filing a plan following Brown; but it would
complicate the analysis without changing the basic thrust of our argument.
19We focus on plans involving reductions in coupon payments to one or both creditor classes. This
11
(ii) Creditors receiving bi(pt) < bi (for i = j, s) are impaired under the plan
and are allowed to vote and reject the plan. Classes in receipt of their
contractually specified coupon payment, bi, are referred to as unimpaired
by the plan and are deemed to have accepted the plan.
5. Equity holders are always treated as impaired and allowed to vote on a plan.
6. The equity-holders propose the first restructuring plan by making a take-it or
leave-it offer to creditor.
7. If the plan initially proposed by the equity-holders is rejected by at least one
impaired class, without time delay, the restructuring process moves into a second
stage where a set of plans are simultaneously voted on by impaired stake-holders.
Each plan is the outcome of Nash bargaining amongst impaired classes with
disagreement payoffs equal to their liquidation payoffs.
8. If in the second stage no plan receives unanimous approval, the firm is liqui-
dated.20
9. Absolute priority holds in liquidation.
The second stage of restructuring in our model with voting on Nash bargaining alloca-
tions captures two essential features of chapter 11. First, as argued by legal scholars,
in Chapter 11 judicial discretion is granted in many circumstances (see Schwartz
(2002)) resulting in a ‘refereed’ bargaining system. We allow for exogenous asymme-
tries between parties (which might reflect the ability of claim-holders to influence the
is in line with Perraudin and Mella-Barral (1997). Alternative approaches to implementing a plan
include permanent reduction of face value, as examined in Mella-Barral (1999), or debt-equity swaps
such as those employed in Fan and Sundaresan (2000).
20We implicitly assume that only consensual plans (i.e. plans accepted by impaired creditors) are
confirmed, thereby abstracting from cram down possibilities.
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court) by using a Nash asymmetric bargaining.21
Second, rather than letting all players bargain together in a Nash cooperative
framework, we emphasize the importance of the impairment rule during the entire
restructuring process, which allows for the exclusion of a class from the bargaining
table.
Note that there are many different ways of modeling the second stage of restruc-
turing. Brown (1989) assumes that only a finite number of proposals is allowed and
the bankruptcy court determines the order in which proposals can be voted. Each
proposal might rank first, second, or third in the agenda with same probability.
C Bargaining
Throughout this section we assume that the firm has entered bankruptcy. In the
next section, we analyse the optimal choice of the equity holder to enter bankruptcy.
Moreover, we restrict the analysis of this section to the case when the firm is in
bankruptcy at a level of the cashflow pt such that VL(pt) ≤ Fs. We discuss in the
Appendix the case in which VL(pt) > Fs.
22
We begin by solving the cooperative game. Assumptions 2.4, 2.5 and 2.7 imply
that there are three possible bargaining allocations depending on whether agents are
unimpaired and hence excluded from bargaining. These are:
(i) All stake-holders are impaired and each class receives a Nash bargaining share
21According to Welch (1997), such asymmetry can be explained as a reflection of different orga-
nization skills and reputations. Welch argues that a bank, unlike bond-holders, may benefit from
having a reputation for “tough behavior,” which may discourage other borrowers from attempting
opportunistic renegotiation. Our Nash axiomatic approach is also in line with Fan and Sundaresan
(2000) and with Aivazian and Callen (1983) who argue that a cooperative approach is the best
representation of formal renegotiation supervised by the Court.
22In this case, as we show in Appendix, after a first restructuring takes place, the new equilibrium
is such that the firm is always restructured when VL(pt) = Fs, which reconnects to the case discussed
here.
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of the assets denoted by Pe, Pj and Ps for the equity, junior and senior class
respectively;
(ii) The junior class is impaired (along with the equity holders -always impaired)
and the senior is unimpaired; the equity holder and the junior class receive a
Nash bargaining share, denoted as Pe,j, Pj,e while the senior class continues
receiving the full coupon bs with claim value denoted by S.
(iii) The senior class is impaired (along with the equity holders) and the junior is
unimpaired; the equity holder and the senior class receive a Nash bargaining
share, denoted as Pe,s, Ps,e while the junior class continues receiving the full
coupon bj with claim value denoted by J .
In what follows, we (i) formalize the three different types of Nash bargaining alloca-
tions and (ii) analyze how agents will vote between these three possibilities.
If the state variable pt falls far enough, we expect that in equilibrium, even if
the plan adopted is type (ii) (only junior initially impaired) or type (iii) (only senior
initially impaired), eventually both debt classes will be impaired.23 Let ps denote the
level of the state variable at which senior debt is impaired in a type (ii) plan, and pj
denotes the trigger level for junior impairment in a type (i) plan.
Let the absolute bargaining power of class i = e, j, s be denoted xi . When one
class is unimpaired, the relative bargaining powers are ηi = xi/(xi+xe) for i = j, s and
1 − ηi for the equity holders. When all classes are impaired, the relative bargaining
powers are: ξi = xi/(xe + xj + xs) with i = e, j, s.
The allocations received by the security-holder groups under the three possible
23We expect both classes to be impaired ultimately as pt falls since, by assumption, Fs > γ, and
hence as pt moves towards p (and, therefore, V (pt) approaches the scrap value γ) the level of cash
flow is insufficient to continue paying the full contractual coupon to either creditor class.
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plans may be expressed as follows:
1. Equity and junior debt impaired and senior unimpaired, with allocation:
Equity claim = Pe,j ≡ (1− ηj)(V (pt)− S(pt, ps)),
Junior debt claim = Pj,e ≡ ηj(V (pt)− S(pt, ps)),
Senior debt claim = S(pt, ps)
(4)
2. Equity and senior debt impaired and junior unimpaired, with allocation:
Equity claim = Pe,s ≡ (1− ηs)(V (pt)− J(pt, pj)− VL(pt)),
Senior debt claim = Ps,e ≡ ηs(V (pt)− J(pt, pj)− VL(pt)) + VL(pt),
Junior debt claim = J(pt, pj)
(5)
3. Equity and both debt classes impaired, with allocation:
Equity claim = Pe ≡ ξe(V (pt)− VL(pt)),
Junior debt claim = Pj ≡ ξj(V (pt)− VL(pt)),
Senior debt claim = Ps ≡ ξs(V (pt)− VL(pt)) + VL(pt).
(6)
To understand which plan is accepted at different levels of the state variable, pt,
it is helpful to calculate the following threshold levels:
p∗s = argmaxPj,e(pt, ps) = argmaxPe,j(pt, ps)
= argminS(pt, ps) =
λ
λ− 1
Fs − γ(1− αξs)
αξs
(r − µ) (7)
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where αξs ≡ ξs(1− α) + α.
p∗j = argmaxPs,e(pt, pj) = argmaxPe,s(pt, pj)
= argmin J(pt, pj) =
λ
λ− 1
Fj + γξj(1− α)
ξj(1− α) (r − µ) (8)
The following lemma reveals how, for different levels of the state variable, pt, each
debt class views the choice between being jointly impaired (along with the other debt
class) or being impaired alone.
Lemma 1 Junior debt holders prefer: i) to be impaired alone rather than jointly with
senior debt holders for any pt > p
∗
s and ii) to be jointly impaired with senior creditors
for pt ≤ p∗s. Similarly, senior debt holders prefer: i) to be impaired alone rather than
jointly with junior debt holders for any pt > p
∗
j and ii) to be jointly impaired with
junior creditors for pt ≤ p∗s.
Proof: See Appendix. 2
When the firm is in bankruptcy there are three possible plans the equity holders
can vote, Pe,j, Pe,s and Pe. The preferences of the equity holders over the three
possible plans are given by the following lemma.
Lemma 2 If p∗s < p
∗
j , for pt > p
∗
j , Pe,j > Pe,s > Pe and for pt ∈ (p∗s, p∗j ], Pe,j >
Pe,s = Pe. While if p
∗
j < p
∗
s, for pt > p
∗
s, Pe,s > Pe,j > Pe and for pt ∈ (p∗j , p∗s],
Pe,s > Pe,j = Pe. For pt ≤ min{ps, pj} Pe,j = Pe,s = Pe.
Proof: See Appendix. 2
The preferences of debt and equity holders over the different plans derived from
Lemmas 1 and 2 are summarized in Table 1 and illustrated in Figure 2. In the figure,
we show the value of junior, senior debt (top diagram) and equity values (bottom
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diagram) under the different plans when p∗j > p
∗
s. In the table, we set out how
stake-holder groups rank the different plans for different levels of the state variable,
pt.
Table 1: Securities-holder Voting
Case 1: p∗s < p
∗
j
pt ≥ p∗j p∗s ≤ pt < p∗j pt ≤ p∗s
S J E S J E S J E
Senior impaired, junior not yes – – no no – – no no – – no
Junior impaired, senior not – – yes yes – – yes yes – – no no
Both impaired no no no yes no no yes yes yes
Case 2: p∗j < p
∗
s
pt ≥ p∗s p∗j ≤ pt < p∗s pt ≤ p∗j
S J E S J E S J E
Senior impaired, junior not yes – – yes yes – – yes no – – no
Junior impaired, senior not – – yes no – – no no – – no no
Both impaired no no no no yes no yes yes yes
In the next sub-section, we combine the implications of Lemmas 1 and 2 as sum-
marized in Table 1 and an analysis of the optimal bankruptcy trigger in order to infer
results on equilibrium.
D Equilibrium
In the following proposition, we describe the equilibrium in our model and show that,
for a given set of model parameters, it is unique.
Proposition 1 If p∗s < p
∗
j , no restructuring occurs for pt > pbj, the junior debt alone
is restructured for pt ∈ [p∗s, pbj] and both debt classes are restructured together when
17
pt < p
∗
s.
24
Alternatively, if p∗s > p
∗
j , no restructuring occurs for pt > pbs, the senior debt
alone is restructured for pt ∈ [p∗j , pbs] and both debt classes are restructured together
when pt < p
∗
j .
The bankruptcy triggers, pbs and pbj, in the two cases equal:
pbj = λ/(1− λ) (ηjFs + Fj)/ηj (r − µ) if p∗s < p∗j
pbs = λ/(1− λ) (ηsFj + Fs − γ(1− αηs))/αηs( r − µ) if p∗s > p∗j
(9)
where αηs ≡ ηs(1− α) + α. When p∗s < p∗j , then p∗s < pbj < p∗j . When, p∗j < p∗s, then
p∗j < pbs < p
∗
s.
Proof: Equilibrium consists of (i) a plan that, for a given level of the state variable,
pt, is acceptable to any stake-holders that are impaired at that level of pt, and (ii) a
trigger level for bankruptcy, pb that maximizes equity value.
From Table 1, it is evident that, if p∗s < p
∗
j , in the cooperative game, there is only
one plan that, for all levels of the state variable, is accepted by all impaired stake-
holders, namely the plan in which junior debt-holders are impaired for p∗s < pt ≤ p∗j
and both debt-holder groups are impaired for pt < p
∗
s. Similarly, when p
∗
j ≤ p∗s, there
is again a single plan that is accepted by all impaired stake-holders, namely the plan
in which senior debt-holders are impaired for p∗j < pt ≤ p∗s and both debt-holder
groups are impaired for pt ≤ p∗j .
By assumption, equity-holders determine the timing of bankruptcy by ceasing to
pay the contractual coupon. Solving for the trigger level that maximizes the value
of equity in the two cases (p∗s < p
∗
j and p
∗
j < p
∗
s), we obtain the bankruptcy triggers
stated in the proposition (for derivations, see the Appendix). 2
24Note that the assumption Fs > γ guarantees that p∗s is greater than p.
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In the following proposition, we characterize those parameter values which are
associated with the two possible outcomes, initial restructuring of the senior debt or
initial restructuring of the junior debt.
Proposition 2 p∗j ≶ p∗s if and only if
Fs − γ
αξs
≷ Fj
ξj(1− α) . (10)
The intuition behind this result is simple. When the equity holder precipitate
bankruptcy, they would benefit from reducing coupon payments to the creditor whose
face value is relatively high compared to the overall face value F . However, the
benefit of impairing the creditor with higher face value must be weighed against the
‘strength’ of that creditor at the negotiating table; that is, the ability to extract a
valuable package of concessions in renegotiation. This depends on the liquidation
value of the firm, the priority of the claim, and the creditor’s bargaining power. The
higher α and γ, the bigger the firm liquidation value, which, in turn, strengthens the
bargaining position of the senior creditor while weakening that of the junior creditor.
Therefore, when the firm liquidation value is sufficiently high, the equity holders
and the junior creditor agree on a plan which leaves the senior creditor unimpaired and
share the surplus generated by excluding a strong senior creditor from the negotiating
table. The senior creditor is impaired (along with the junior one) only when the
liquidation threat of the senior creditor becomes less valuable. This occurs if the
state variable falls sufficiently low, at a level p∗s. This type of equilibrium, which,
according to Proposition 2, occurs when p∗s < p
∗
j is depicted in Figure 3 where we
illustrate debt and equity values and the state-dependent coupon payments (derived
in Appendix) to each debt class.
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We discuss the implications of our model in the next section and we conclude this
section by highlighting how our results differ from those of Brown (1989).
First, in Brown’s study senior classes are always fully secured and (legally as
well as economically) unimpaired,25 which implies that the spread of senior classes
is always zero. Unlike Brown, we show that senior creditor can be left unimpaired
even if her/his liquidation value is below face value (VL < Fs). This is because the
dynamic nature of our model allows us to distinguish between legal un-impairment
and economic un-impairment. We can have economic impairment despite legal un-
impairment (achieved by unaltering contractual coupon payments).
Second, even if VL is greater than senior face value (therefore the senior class should
be virtually fully secured26), not only the senior spread is positive (because S(pt) is
always below Fs) and but also bankruptcy renegotiation contributes to increasing the
senior spread.27 In other words, the senior creditor would be better off if the firm
was liquidated. Moreover, and most importantly this entails APV in favor of junior
classes.
Third, our model also allows for un-impairment of junior classes (when first
bankruptcy occurs). The reason why is that the scope of un-impairment in our pa-
per is broader than in Brown’s study. Brown uses un-impairment to limit the payoff
to senior classes. We use un-impairment not only to limit payoff to senior creditors
(for instance when the firm liquidation value is above senior face value), but also to
exclude ‘strong’ creditors from the negotiating table. Therefore, the set of strategy
is expanded compared to Brown, because the strong creditor might be the junior
25Brown refers to senior classes as to classes whose liquidation value is sufficient to fully re-
pay the claim value. In our paper seniority is a pre-bankruptcy provision, not endogenous to the
bankruptcy/liquidation outcome.
26This case should be more directly comparable to Brown’s study.
27A detailed discussion of the contribution of renegotiation on the senior spread is presented in
the next section.
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creditor and not necessarily the senior one. Unlike Brown, our model can deliver
(depending on parameter values, see Proposition 2) an equilibrium where the junior
creditor is left unimpaired when the first bankruptcy occurs and is impaired along
with the senior in a second bankruptcy (with declined assets value).
III Credit spreads and priority violation
A Priority and renegotiation premia
In this section, we expand on the implications of the model for the pricing of debt.
The key point is that the opportunity to reschedule claims sequentially allows the
equity holders to delay renegotiation with the ‘strong’ creditor until the firm value is
sufficiently low and hence the liquidation threat is less effective.
We shall show that the difficulty of enforcing seniority may have a substantial
impact on spreads. To this effect, we follow Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) in
defining the percentage contribution of sequential renegotiation to the senior credit
spread as:
rps =
min{VL, Fs} − S
Fs − S (11)
During restructuring, if a creditor can threaten to liquidate, one would expect the
renegotiation premium to be negative. That is, the possibility of rescheduling debt
should reduce spreads for levels of the state variable for which restructuring occurs.
Our analysis shows that, with sequential renegotiation, this conclusion still holds
for the junior creditors. Whether junior or senior debt is rescheduled first, the rene-
gotiation premium to the junior creditor is always negative.28
28If the junior creditor is left unimpaired, his liquidation payoff at the first bankruptcy threshold
pbs is equal to max{VL − Fs, 0} = 0 (because when the senior is impaired first VL(pbs) < Fs).
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In contrast, however, if senior claim-holders are left unimpaired in restructuring,
by losing their veto power, senior debt-holders lose a valuable outside option. Depend-
ing on whether junior creditors or they are first impaired, the renegotiation premium
of senior creditors may be positive or negative.
Our results are summarized in Figure 4, which shows the renegotiation premium
rps (evaluated at a particular level of the state variable, pt) as a function of the senior
debt service flow, bs. In the figure, bs varies from 0 to 0.25 while the total coupon
payment, bs + bj, is held constant at 0.25).
B Spread reversals between senior and junior spread
Comparison of the credit spreads of the senior and the junior creditors (i.e., CSs =
bs
S
− r and CSj = bjJ − r) yields a further interesting implication of our model. In
Figure 5, we show the two spreads, as functions of bs.
29 The spreads are evaluated
at the same level of pt but for three different level of total debt face value, namely
b1 = 0.25, b2 = 0.30 and b3 = 0.35. Note that for all three levels of total debt face
value, for a high enough level of senior face value, the senior spreads exceed those for
junior debt.
One may derive a simple sufficient condition that rules out spread reversals for all
levels of the state variable. To do this, we wish to compare the junior spread and the
spread of the senior claim when the latter is ‘stripped’ of the scrapping value γ. We
refer to the ‘stripped claim’ as the senior ‘unsecured’ claim. One may decompose the
Therefore, as J is positive, the renegotiation premium to the junior creditor is negative (that is,
rpj = −J/(Fj − J) < 0). If the junior is impaired first, at pbj , his Nash bargaining share Pj,e is
always above his liquidation payoff and, again, rpj is negative.
29The parameters employed are the same as those used in Figure 4.
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senior spread in the following way:
CSs = r
Fs − S
S
= r
(Fs − γ)− (S − γ)
S
· S − γ
S − γ
= r
Fˆs − Sˆ
Sˆ
· Sˆ
S
. (12)
Here, Sˆ ≡ S − γ and Fˆs ≡ Fs − γ. The first term in equation (12) denoted
ĈSs = r
Fˆs − Sˆ
Sˆ
, (13)
represents the credit spread on the senior ‘unsecured’ claim. The second term, Sˆ/S,
captures the effect of the ‘fully-secured’ part of the claim on the overall credit spread
CSs.
30 Some simple algebra yields:
ĈSs − CSj = r FˆsJ − SˆFj
SˆJ
. (14)
Using the above definitions, one may derive the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The difference ĈSs − CSj is positive if and only if the equilibrium
impairment strategy is {p∗j , pbs}. ĈSs−CSj is negative if and only if the impairment
strategy is {p∗s, pbj}. The equality holds, and ĈSs − CSj = 0 when p∗j = p∗s.
Proof: See Appendix. 2
Note that Proposition 3 provides a sufficient condition for the case in which CSs <
CSj for any level of the state variable. In fact, the inequality CSs < CSj rearranges
into ĈSsSˆ/S < CSj, which holds if ĈSs < CSj because the term Sˆ/S is always
30We employ the term ‘fully-secured’ to mean that S can never fall below γ. In fact, the bigger
the fully-secured part of the claim the smaller the ratio Sˆ/S and the spread CSs.
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smaller than one. When the collateral γ tends to zero, the sufficient condition becomes
also a necessary condition (because, by definition of ĈSs, with γ = 0 then ĈSs =
CSs). This result can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If γ tends to zero, the difference CSs − CSj is positive if and only
if the impairment strategy is {p∗j , pbs}. CSs − CSj is negative if and only if the
impairment strategy is {p∗s, pbj}. When p∗j = p∗s, then CSs − CSj = 0.
Proof: See Appendix. 2
In general, low collateral value VL (that is, low α and/or γ) makes reversal of the
spreads more likely because the effective bargaining strength of the senior creditor
decreases and that of the junior increases (with α and/or γ decreasing). When a
senior creditor is impaired first, seniority is enforceable, however there is little value
attached to it because the liquidation threat has little impact.
C Empirical Implications
In practice, senior secured creditors are rarely impaired by a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
plan and when they are, the impairment typically involves all classes (see LoPucki
(2004) and LoPucki and Whitford (1993)). In the dataset used by LoPucki and Whit-
ford (1993) we could analyse the treatment of each class for 31 Chapter 11 cases.31 Out
of 31 cases, in 19 cases, at least one creditor’s class was unimpaired, most frequently
a secured class. Moreover, amongst these 19 cases, in 15 cases only senior or secured
classes were unimpaired while more junior or unsecured classes were impaired, while
in 4 cases an unsecured class was unimpaired with a more senior class impaired. In the
remaining 12 of the total 31 cases, all classes were impaired. In particular, of these 12
31The data consisted of 43 cases, but we did not have sufficient information on 12 cases about
un-impairment.
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cases, in 6 cases the priority structure was flat, e.g. no senior/secured/subordinated
debt existed, in 6 cases there were secured debt (4 cases) and senior/subordinated
debt (2 cases). Hence, the most empirically relevant observed equilibrium involves
the junior debt being impaired first. This is consistent with our model, where senior
debt is impaired first only if junior face value is particularly small relative to senior
face value.32
Most important, empirical evidence shows that a large number of firms restructure
their debt a second time. Using a sample of 197 public companies over the period
1979 − 88, Hotchkiss (1995) finds that 32% of firms restructure their debt a second
time either in Chapter 11 or in a private workout. Similarly, according to Gilson
(1997), almost 25 percent of firms file for bankruptcy or restructure their debts a
second time. More recent evidence can be found from LoPucki’s BRD. Over 111
large public companies emerging from Chapter 11 during the period 2000 − 2005,
25.23% refiled within 5 years.
The idea that Chapter 11 rules are particularly disadvantageous to secured cred-
itors is widely recognized by legal scholars. Bebchuck and Fried (1996) argue that
Chapter 11 rules tend to redistribute value from secured to unsecured creditors and
to equity holders and that secured creditors may receive less than what they would
receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation. Also, the general idea of Absolute Priority Vio-
lation in Chapter 11 is supported by several empirical studies suggesting that junior
creditors and equity holders receive non-zero distributions before secured and/or se-
nior creditors are fully paid. Frank and Torous (1994) find ‘positive deviation’ from
absolute priority benefiting junior creditors and equity holders while bank, senior and
secured creditors exhibit ‘negative deviation’ (with secured debt bearing the largest
32In Figure 5 senior claims are impaired first if the junior face value is less than 12% of total face
value.
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deviation).
Violation of Absolute Priority in Chapter 11 reorganizations has been documented
by Weiss (1990), Eberhart et al. (1990), Altman (1991), Fabozzi et al. (1993), Altman
and Eberhart (1994), Franks and Torous (1994). In particular, the possibility of
positive renegotiation premia is in line with Pulvino and Pidot (1997) who find that
bonds with very high collateral ratios (which, they argue, in principle, should be
immune to default risk) yield 160 basis points above highly-rated bond yields.33
D Legal context
One may note that our analysis is consistent with the fact that secured, unimpaired
creditors sometimes engage in legal action to resist a restructuring. In a Chapter 11
proceeding, unimpaired creditors often file a number of objections to confirmation
of a plan and/or motions to convert to Chapter 7 or to lift (debtor) from automatic
stay. Motions and objections to confirmation typically address such issues as im-
proper classification, treatment of classes34 and lack of feasibility of the plan.35 Even
though objections by unimpaired creditors are quite common, courts typically hold
that a creditor whose rights are unimpaired under the plan has no right to object to
confirmation.36
Though there may be no legal impairment, the default risk of senior or secured
33Their study uses US Airline secured bond yields and collateral.
34In re Mirant Corporation, et al. (Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Texas, case n. 03-
46590-DML-11, 2005) the Court denies the motion by a senior creditor (unimpaired and, hence, not
entitled to vote), who argues that the plan actually impairs the Senior Notes and so entitled to vote.
35In re: Tavern Motor Inn Inc. (Bankruptcy Court, District of Vermont, case n. 56 B.R. 446,
1985), an unimpaired secured creditor filed a motion to convert the case into Chapter 7. The creditor
argued the plan (approved by impaired unsecured creditors) actually impairs his class and is not
feasible because there is a “likelihood of liquidation or further financial reorganization”. The motion
was denied.
36See In re Wonder Corp. of America, Bankruptcy Court, District of Connecticut, case n.70 B.R.
1018, 1023, 1987.
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debt is affected because of the possibility of further deterioration of asset value and
the consequent need to restructure senior/secured classes too. According to the Code,
a plan must be feasible in the sense of not being likely to be followed by liquidation
or need of further financial reorganization.37
However, as repeatedly held by the Bankruptcy Courts, the concept of feasibility
simply involves reasonable prospects of financial stability and success. It is not neces-
sary that success be guaranteed, but only that there may be a reasonable expectation
of success. The mere prospect of financial uncertainty cannot defeat confirmation on
feasibility grounds since a guarantee of the future is not required.38
It is worth noting that the possibility that an unimpaired senior/secured creditor
receives a value, S, inferior to his collateral, VL, is not ruled out by the Bankruptcy
Code. In particular, the Code restricts the application of what is known as the “best
interest test” to impaired creditors.39 This test requires that impaired creditors must
receive at least what they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation. Therefore, as the
best interest test does not apply to unimpaired classes40 nothing prevents positive
renegotiation premia in Chapter 11.
Last, it is worth mentioning that in formal bankruptcy, if a plan of reorganization
is confirmed, even if a cross-default can be asserted, confirmation of the plan resolves
and eliminates it. That is, when non-impaired debt contains cross-default provisions,
cure of the cross-defaults can be accomplished even if other classes are impaired
37Bankruptcy Code, Section 1129, Paragraph (a)(11).
38See In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New
York, case n. 138 B.R. 723, 1992.
39Bankruptcy Code, Section 1129, Paragraph (a)(7).
40See Seatco, Inc., (Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Texas, case n. 00-37332-BJH-11,
2001) where “Class 3 creditors are unimpaired under the Plan and the best interest test is not
applicable to them”. See also, Bankruptcy Reform Act 1978, House Report (n.95-595) stating “the
court may confirm a plan over the objection of a class of secured claims if the members of that class
are unimpaired”.
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under the plan (see in In re: Mirant Corporation, et al., Bankruptcy Court, Northern
District of Texas, case n. 03-46590-DML-11, 2005). This point is obvious because
it would be inconsistent with the purposes of Chapter 11 to allow cross-defaults to
defeat confirmation. Therefore, it emerges from our study that the purpose of cross
default clauses is that of preventing equity holders from renegotiation with other
creditor classes outside of chapter 11.
IV Conclusion
We show in this paper that sequential bankruptcy (Chapter 22) is a structural feature
of Chapter 11 which resolves potential conflicts amongst senior and junior creditors.
Recent empirical findings suggests that the outcome of Chapter 11 restructuring seems
more and more driven by these type of conflicts rather than by conflicts amongst
creditors and equity holders. In particular, we show that by leaving the contractual
features of some debt claims unchanged (legal un-impairment), a group of stake-
holders (equity and junior classes or equity and senior classes) cooperate in order
to reach an agreement where unimpaired classes have no veto power and lose their
outside option to liquidate the firm.
First, we find that, for reasonable parameter values, it is more likely that the
equity holder and the junior creditor agree on a plan which leaves the senior creditor
unimpaired at the first bankruptcy threshold. This is consistent with empirical find-
ings. Commonly senior/secured creditors are unimpaired while more junior classes
and equity holders share in the bankruptcy distribution. A second bankruptcy is trig-
gered only if the firm value drops sufficiently low, in which case also senior creditor is
restructured along with junior one. The intuition behind this type of equilibrium is
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simple. When the senior creditor is in a strong bargaining position (highly secured in
the event of liquidation), more junior stake-holders strategically delay renegotiation
with a strong senior class until the firm value is low and hence seniority provisions
are less valuable. The strategic use of the impairment rule comes from the dynamic
nature of our model. By continuing serving contractual obligations, we are able to
distinguish between legal and economic un-impairment. Despite legally unimpaired,
senior claims are economically impaired with regards to their priority level.
Moreover, this type of equilibrium contributes to increasing the senior spread to
the extent where the senior creditor would be better off if the firm was liquidated.
On the other hand, this entails larger APV in favor of junior classes.
Second, the scope of un-impairment in our paper is broad and not only serves to
reduce the value of seniority. Our model also allows for a second type of equilibrium
where junior classes are left unimpaired (at first bankruptcy). This occurs when
junior face value is particularly small compared to total face value and/or junior
creditors have strong bargaining power. The intuition here is that even if junior
classes, unlike senior ones, have no effective liquidation threat, they might still be
though negotiator in bankruptcy as bargaining power should not depend on the size
of a claim. Moreover, (when the size of the junior claim is small) impairing a small
claim (while leaving a relatively larger one unimpaired) might not be a viable way
out of bankruptcy. In practice this equilibrium is relevant when banks or, more likely,
vulture funds owns junior debt. Also, this type of equilibrium is consistent with the
treatment of convenience claims (small unsecured claims placed in a separate class
for administrative convenience) often left unimpaired in bankruptcy.
Interestingly, the second type of equilibrium, where the senior creditor is impaired
first and the junior one later on, might result in reversal of senior and junior spreads.
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The senior credit spread may be higher than the junior one. Reversal of the spreads
does not occur in the first type of equilibrium where the senior creditor is unimpaired
at the first Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
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A Appendix with Proofs
Proof for Lemma 1
First, we prove that Pj,e(pt, p∗s) ≥ Pj(pt) for pt ≥ p∗s. Because p∗s minimizes S(pt, p∗s)
(thus S(pt, p∗s) smooth-pastes to Ps(pt) from below), for pt ≥ p∗s we can write
Pj,e(pt, p∗s) = ηj(V (pt)− S(pt, p∗s)) ≥ ηj(V (pt)− Ps(pt)) = (15)
= ηj(Pe(pt) + Pj(pt)) (16)
=
xj
xe + xj
xe + xj
xe + xj + xs
(V (pt)− VL(pt)) (17)
= ξj(V (pt)− VL(pt)) (18)
= Pj(pt) (19)
Also, because ∂S(pt, p∗s)/∂pt |p∗s= ∂Ps(pt)/∂pt |p∗s (again, due to the fact that p∗s = argminS(pt, p∗s))
it is immediate to see, from a similar calculation, that Pj,e(pt, p∗s) smooth-pastes to Pj(pt),
that is
∂Pj,e(pt, p∗s)
∂pt
|p∗s =
∂ηj(V (pt)− S(pt, p∗s))
∂pt
|p∗s (20)
=
∂ηj(Pe(pt) + Pj(pt))
∂pt
|p∗s (21)
=
∂Pj(pt)
∂pt
|p∗s . (22)
Therefore, we conclude that Pj,e(pt, p∗s) smooth-pastes to Pj(pt) from above. This means
that for any pt ≥ p∗s the junior creditor prefers to bargain directly with the equity holders
while leaving the senior creditor unimpaired. Moreover, the value of junior creditor is
maximized if the senior creditor is impaired (along with the junior one) when the state
variable hits the level p∗s.
Similarly we can prove that Ps,e(pt, p∗j ) ≥ Ps(pt) for pt ≥ p∗j . Given that p∗j minimizes
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J(pt, p∗j ), then J(pt, p
∗
j ) smooth-pastes to Pj(pt) from below. Therefore for pt ≥ p∗j we have
Ps,e(pt, p∗s) = ηs(V (pt)− J(pt, p∗j )− VL(pt)) + VL(pt) ≥ (23)
≥ ηs(V (pt)− Pj(pt)− VL(pt)) + VL(pt) (24)
= ηs(Pe(pt) + Ps(pt)− VL(pt)) + VL(pt) (25)
= ηs
(
xe(V (pt)− VL(pt))
xe + xj + xs
+
xs(V (pt)− VL(pt))
xe + xj + xs
+ VL(pt)− VL(pt)
)
+ VL(pt)(26
= ξs(V (pt)− VL(pt)) + VL(pt) (27)
= Ps(pt) (28)
Furthermore, because p∗j minimizes J(pt, p
∗
j ) (therefore ∂J(pt, p
∗
j )/∂pt |p∗j= ∂Pj(pt)/∂pt |p∗j ),
we have that Ps,e(pt, p∗j ) smooth-pastes to Ps(pt), that is
∂Ps,e(pt, p∗j )
∂pt
|p∗j =
∂(ηs(V (pt)− J(pt, p∗j )− VL(pt)) + VL(pt))
∂pt
|p∗j (29)
=
∂(ηs(Pe(pt) + Ps(pt)− VL(pt)) + VL(pt))
∂pt
|p∗j (30)
=
∂Ps(pt)
∂pt
|p∗j . (31)
We conclude that Ps,e(pt, p∗j ) smooth-pastes to Ps(pt) from above. Therefore, for any pt ≥ p∗j
the senior creditor prefers to be impaired alone and the value of his claim is maximized if
the junior creditor is impaired when the state variable hits the level p∗j . 2
Proof for Lemma 2
First consider the case where p∗s < p∗j . We know that for pt ≤ p∗j , Pe,s = V (pt)−Ps,e(pt, p∗j )−
J(pt, p∗j ) rearranges as Pe,s = V (pt) − Ps(pt) − Pj(pt) = Pe. The reason for this is that p∗j
maximizes the equity value when the equity holder impair the senior creditor alone (see
equation 8 second equality) and hence for pt < p∗j it is optimal to impair both classes.
Therefore Ps,e(pt, p∗j ) and J(pt, p
∗
j ) become equal to Ps(pt) and Pj(pt) respectively. Therefore
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for pt ∈ (p∗s, p∗j ] we can verify that Pe,j > Pe,s as follows:
Pe,s = Pe = V (pt)− Ps(pt)− Pj(pt) < V (pt)− Pj,e(pt, p∗s)− S(pt, p∗s) = Pe,j (32)
S(pt, p∗s) + Pj,e(pt, p
∗
s) < Pj(pt) + Ps(pt) (33)
S(pt, p∗s) + ηj(V (pt)− S(pt, p∗s)) < Pj(pt) + Ps(pt) (34)
ηjV (pt) + (1− ηj)S(pt, p∗s) < Pj(pt) + Ps(pt) (35)
because for pt > p∗s S(pt, p∗s) < Ps(pt), then we can take an upper bound to the left hand
side,
ηjV (pt) + (1− ηj)S(pt, p∗s) < ηjV (pt) + (1− ηj)Ps(pt) = (36)
= ηj(V (pt)− Ps(pt)) + Ps(pt) = Pj(pt) + Ps(pt). (37)
Furthermore, it follows from Lemma 1 (where Pj,e(pt, p∗s) smooth-pastes to Pj(pt) at p∗s)
that Pe,j smooth-pastes to Pe at the threshold level p∗s, in particular
∂Pe
∂pt
|p∗s =
∂(V (pt)− Ps(pt)− Pj(pt))
∂pt
|p∗s= (38)
=
∂(V (pt)− S(pt, p∗s)− Pj,e(pt, p∗s))
∂pt
|p∗s=
∂Pe,j
∂pt
|p∗s . (39)
Now, we consider the case where p∗j < p
∗
s. For pt ≤ p∗s, by a similar argument to the
previous case, we can rewrite Pe,j = V (pt)−Pj,e(pt, p∗s)−S(pt, p∗s) as Pe,j = V (pt)−Ps(pt)−
Pj(pt) = Pe(pt). Then for pt ∈ (p∗j , p∗s], we verify that
Pe,j = Pe = V (pt)− Ps(pt)− Pj(pt) < V (pt)− Ps,e(pt, p∗j )− J(pt, p∗j ) = Pe,s (40)
Ps,e(pt, p∗j ) + J(pt, p
∗
j ) < Pj(pt) + Ps(pt) (41)
ηs(V (pt)− J(pt, p∗j )− VL(pt)) + VL(pt) + J(pt, p∗j ) < Pj(pt) + Ps(pt) (42)
ηs(V (pt)− VL(pt)) + VL(pt) + (1− ηs)J(pt, p∗j ) < Pj(pt) + Ps(pt) (43)
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because for pt > p∗j J(pt, p
∗
j ) < Pj(pt) then we can take an upper bound to the left hand
side,
ηs(V − VL) + VL + (1− ηs)J(pt, p∗j ) < ηs(V − VL) + VL + (1− ηs)Pj(pt) = (44)
= ηs(V − VL − Pj(pt)) + VL + Pj(pt) = Ps(pt) + Pj(pt). (45)
Additionally, from Lemma 1 (where Ps,e(pt, p∗j ) smooth-pastes to Ps(pt) at p
∗
j ) that Pe,s
smooth-pastes to Pe at the threshold level p∗j , in particular
∂Pe
∂pt
|p∗j =
∂(V (pt)− Ps(pt)− Pj(pt))
∂pt
|p∗j= (46)
=
∂(V (pt)− Ps,e(pt, p∗j )− J(pt, p∗j ))
∂pt
|p∗j=
∂Pe,s
∂pt
|p∗j . (47)
Last, it is immediate that for pt ≤ min{ps, pj} Pe,s = Pe,j = Pe all claims are impaired
collectively -regardless of which claim has been impaired first. That is, Pj,e(pt, p∗s) = Pj(pt),
S(pt, p∗s) = Ps(pt), Ps,e(pt, p∗j ) = Ps(pt) and J(pt, p
∗
j ) = Pj(pt). 2
Derivations for Proposition 1
Case 1). If p∗s < p∗j , agreed claim values in bankruptcy are Pj,e(pt, p
∗
s) and S(pt, p
∗
s). The
equity holder maximizes the equity value by solving the following
max
pb
E = max
pb
V (pt)−
{
Fj + [Pj,e(pb, p∗s)− Fj ]
(
pt
pb
)λ}
−
{
Fs + [Ps(p∗s)− Fs]
(
pt
p∗s
)λ}
,
equivalently
min
pb
Fj + [Pj,e(pb, p∗s)− Fj ]
(
pt
pb
)λ
which yields
pbj =
λ
1− λ
ηjFs + Fj
ηj
(r − µ). (48)
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Case 2). When p∗s > p∗j the equity holder maximizes
max
pb
E = max
pb
V (pt)−
Fj + [Pj(p∗j )− Fj ]
(
pt
p∗j
)λ−
{
Fs + [Ps,e(pb, p∗s)− Fs]
(
pt
pb
)λ}
,
which yields
pbs =
λ
1− λ
ηsFj + Fs − γ(1− αηs)
αηs
(r − µ) (49)
with
αηs = ηs(1− α) + α.
Furthermore, we can show that when p∗s ≥ p∗j then pbs ∈ [p∗j , p∗s]. (A proof showing that
p∗s < p∗j if and only if pbj ∈ [p∗s, p∗j ] follows the same line as the one below, therefore we omit
it.) As pointed out in Proposition 2 it is immediate to find that p∗s ≥ p∗j when
(Fs − γ)1− α
αξs
≥ Fj
ξj
. (50)
First, we can compare pbs and p∗s, and find what range of parameters guarantees that
pbs < p
∗
s. We find that
pbs =
λ
λ− 1
ηsFj + Fs − γ(1− αηs)
αηs
(r − µ) < λ
λ− 1
Fs − γ(1− αξs)
αξs
(r − µ) = p∗s (51)
rearranges into
Fj < (Fs − γ)αηs − αξs
ηsαξs
. (52)
Substituting for αηs = ηs(1− α) + α and αξs = ξs(1− α) + α in the numerator yields
Fj < (Fs − γ)(ηs − ξs)(1− α)
ηsαξs
, (53)
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and by the definition of ηs = xs/(xs + xe) and ξs = xs/(xs + xe + xj) we have
Fj < (Fs − γ)
xs
xs+xe
− xsxs+xe+xj
xs
xs+xe
1− α
αξs
= (54)
= (Fs − γ)
xs
xs+xe
xj
xs+xe+xj
xs
xs+xe
1− α
αξs
= (55)
= (Fs − γ)
xj
xs+xe+xj
(1− α)
αξs
= (56)
= (Fs − γ)ξj(1− α)
αξs
, (57)
which holds when p∗s ≥ p∗j .
Second, we can compare pbs and p∗j , and check when pbs > p
∗
j , that is,
pbs =
λ
λ− 1
ηsFj + Fs − γ(1− αηs)
αηs
(r − µ) > λ
λ− 1
Fj + γ(1− α)ξj
(1− α)ξj (r − µ) = p
∗
j (58)
which by simple algebra rearranges
Fj < (Fs − γ) (1− α)ξj
αηs − ηs(1− α)ξj
. (59)
Substituting for αηs = ηs(1− α) + α in the denominator yields
Fj < (Fs − γ) (1− α)ξj
ηs(1− α) + α− ηs(1− α)ξj . (60)
By the definition of ηs = xs/(xs+xe) and ξj = xs/(xs+xe+xj) the latter can be rearranged
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as follows
Fj < (Fs − γ) (1− α)ξj
ηs(1− α)(1− ξj) + α = (61)
= (Fs − γ) (1− α)ξjxs
xs+xe
(1− α) xe+xsxs+xe+xj + α
= (62)
= (Fs − γ) (1− α)ξjxs
xs+xe+xj
(1− α) + α = (63)
= (Fs − γ)ξj(1− α)
αξs
, (64)
which holds when p∗s ≥ p∗j .
2
Proof of Proposition 3
By the definitions of ĈSs and CSj , the sign of ĈSs − CSj is positive if and only if
Fs − γ
Fj
>
S − γ
J
. (65)
We prove that this inequality holds when p∗s > p∗j , that is, the senior creditor is impaired
first.
When pt ∈ [p, p∗j ], with S = Ps = ξs(V − VL) + VL and J = Pj = ξj(V − VL) (by
substituting for V − VL = (1− α)(V − γ) and VL − γ = α(V − γ)) inequality 65 rearranges
into
Fs − γ
Fj
>
αξs
ξj(1− α) . (66)
which holds because p∗s > p∗j (see Proposition 2).
When pt ∈ (p∗j , pbs], we know that S = Ps,e and J = Fj+(Pj(p∗j )−Fj)(pt/p∗j )λ, therefore
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inequality 65 becomes
Fs − γ
Fj
>
Ps,e − γ
Fj + (Pj(p∗j )− Fj)(pt/p∗j )λ
. (67)
Now notice that for any pt > p∗j we have that Ps,e < Fs+(Ps(p
∗
j )−Fs)(pt/p∗j )λ (because pbs
is selected by the equity holder to minimize S(pbs, p∗j ) = Fs + (Ps,e(p
∗
j , pbs) − Fs)(pt/pbs)λ
then S(pbs, p∗j ) < S(p
∗
j , p
∗
j ) = Fs + (Ps(p
∗
j ) − Fs)(pt/p∗j )λ). Then we can easily prove that
inequality 67 holds by proving the following first inequality
Fs − γ
Fj
>
Fs + (Ps(p∗j )− Fs)(pt/p∗j )λ − γ
Fj + (Pj(p∗j )− Fj)(pt/p∗j )λ
>
Ps,e − γ
Fj + (Pj(p∗j )− Fj)(pt/p∗j )λ
. (68)
After some algebra, the first inequality rearranges again as
Fs − γ
Fj
>
Ps(p∗j )− γ
Pj(p∗j )
=
αξs
ξj(1− α) . (69)
which again holds for p∗s > p∗j .
Similarly, when pt ∈ (pbs,∞) we can use again the fact S = S(pbs, p∗j ) < S(p∗j , p∗j ) and
show that the following first inequality
Fs − γ
Fj
>
Fs + (Ps(p∗j )− Fs)(pt/p∗j )λ − γ
Fj + (Pj(p∗j )− Fj)(pt/p∗j )λ
>
S − γ
J
, (70)
holds because it rearranges as
Fs − γ
Fj
>
Ps(p∗j )− γ
Pj(p∗j )
=
αξs
ξj(1− α) . (71)
The proof runs similar in the opposite case when p∗j > p
∗
s, and the junior is impaired first.
2
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Proof of Proposition 4
Follows from proof of Proposition 3. 2
B Debt service flow functions.
We derive here the debt service flow functions of senior and junior creditor in the two
alternative scenarios where i) pb = pbs > p∗j and ii) pb = pbj > p
∗
s. In order to avoid lengthy
algebra we solve a general problem first. We know that debt values when restructured are
equal to
S =
 Ps,e = ηs(V (pt)− J(pt, pj)− VL(pt)) + VL(pt) if j is unimpairedPs = ξs(V (pt)− VL(pt)) + VL(pt) if j is impaired (72)
J =
 Pj,e = ηj(V (pt)− J(pt, pj)) if s is unimpairedPj = ξj(V (pt)− VL(pt)) if s is impaired (73)
that is, restructured values are linear functions of V , VL and, if the other class is unimpaired,
also a linear function of the unimpaired debt class value S or J . Because V , VL and
unimpaired debt class J or S are all polynomial equations of degree λ, of the form A0 +
A1pt + A2P λt (with A0, A1 and A2 constant), also restructured values S and J (because
linear functions of polynomial equations) are also polynomial equations of the form D(pt) =
B0+B1pt+B2P λt (with B0, B1 and B2 constant). Therefore the problem is to find a service
flow function b(pt) which satisfies the no arbitrage condition
rD(pt) = b(pt) + µptD′(pt) +
σ2
2
p2tD
′′(pt) (74)
with D(pt) = B0 +B1pt +B2P λt (75)
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where D(pt) is equal to J or S. By substituting for equation (75), D′ and D′′ into equation
(74) and by rearranging, we have
r(B0 +B1pt) + rB2pλt = b(pt) + µptB1 + µλB2p
λ
t + σ
2/2λ(λ− 1)B2pλt , (76)
and because λ is the negative root of r = µλ+ σ2/2λ(λ− 1), equation (76) becomes
r(B0 +B1pt) = b(pt) + µptB1, (77)
which solved for b(pt) yields
b(pt) = rB0 + (r − µ)ptB1. (78)
Now we can derive the senior and junior debt service flow functions by using equation
(78). With regards to the senior creditor, when impaired alone, after substituting for
VL = αV + (1 − αγ), V − VL = (V − γ)(1 − α), J = Fj + (Pj(p∗j ) − Fj)(pt/p∗j )λ and
rearranging, the value Ps,e rewrites as
S = Ps,e = (1−αηs)γ−ηsFj+αηs
pt
r − µ−ηs(Pj(p
∗
j )−Fj)
(
pt
p∗j
)λ
+αηs
(
γ − p
r − µ
)(
pt
p
)λ
,
(79)
therefore by equation (75) we can set B0 = (1−αηs)γ − ηsFj and B1 = αηs/(r− µ) and by
equation (78)
bs(pt) = (1− αηs)rγ − ηsbj + αηspt. (80)
When instead the senior creditor is impaired jointly with the junior one, Ps rearranges as
S = Ps = (1− αξs)γ + αξs
pt
r − µ + αξs
(
γ − p
r − µ
)(
pt
p
)λ
. (81)
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Again, by equation (75), set B0 = (1 − αξs)γ and B1 = αξs/(r − µ) and equation (78)
becomes
bs(pt) = (1− αξs)rγ + αξspt (82)
Similarly, with regards to the junior creditor, when impaired alone (thus S = Fs +
(Ps(p∗s)− Fs)(pt/p∗s)λ), one can rearrange Pj,e as
J = Pj,e = −ηjFs + ηj pt
r − µ − ηj(Ps(p
∗
s)− Fs)
(
pt
p∗s
)λ
+ ηj
(
γ − p
r − µ
)(
pt
p
)λ
, (83)
by equation (75) B0 = −ηjFs and B1 = ηj/(r − µ) and thus equation (78) yields
bj(pt) = ηj(pt − bs). (84)
Finally, when the junior creditor is impaired jointly with the senior one, Pj can be written
as
J = Pj = ξj(1− α)
(
pt
r − µ − γ
)
+ ξj(1− α)
(
γ − p
r − µ
)(
pt
p
)λ
, (85)
therefore with B0 = −ξj(1− α)γ and B1 = ξj(1− α)/(r − µ), equation (78) yields
bj(pt) = ξj(1− α)(pt − rγ). (86)
C Appendix on Case VL(pb) ≥ Fs
For large level of junior face value, renegotiation starts at some level of the state variable
pb such that VL(pb) ≥ Fs. Therefore, the senior creditor would receive Fs if the firm is
liquidated. In this case, senior creditor cannot be impaired (in the sense of being offered
a service flow function, bs(pt) < bs), because impairment would drive the senior value
below his disagreement payoff Fs. Therefore, a reorganization plan (so that the firm is not
liquidated) can only impair the equity and the junior claim and leave the senior unimpaired,
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with allocation:
Pe,j = ηe(V (pt)− S(pt, ps))
Pj,e = ηj(V (pt)− S(pt, ps)− (VL(pt)− Fs)+) + (VL(pt)− Fs)+
S(pt, ps)
The discontinuity in the first derivative of Pj,e can be dealt with by irreversibly writing-
down junior face value when pt hits the level pˆ, with
pˆ : VL(pˆ) = Fs
.
After writing down junior debt, the new level of junior face value, say F j , must be
such that the new junior debt is minimized at pt = pˆ, that is pˆ(F j) = argminJ(pt, pˆ) with
J(pt, pˆ) = F j + (Pj,e(pˆ) − F j)(pt/pˆ)λ. Equivalently, one can say that F j must satisfy the
smooth-pasting condition
∂J(pt, pˆ)
∂pt
|pˆ= ∂Pj,e(pt)
∂pt
|pˆ
which yields
pˆ =
λ
λ− 1
ηjFs + F j
ηj
(r − µ).
Solving for F j gives:
F j = ηj
(
λ
λ− 1
pˆ
r − µ − Fs
)
The service flow function, bj(pt) is derived according to:
rJ(pt) = bj(pt) + µptJ ′(pt) +
σ2
2
p2tJ
′′(pt) (87)
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with
J(pt) = Pj,e =
 ηj(V (pt)− S(pt, ps)− (VL(pt)− Fs)) + (VL(pt)− Fs) if pt > pˆηj(V (pt)− S(pt, ps)) if pt ≤ pˆ
(88)
Equation 87 yields
bj(pt) =

bj if pt > pb, pˇt > pˆ
pt[ηj(1− α) + α] + rγ(1− α)(1− ηj)− bs if pˆ < pt ≤ pb, pˇt > pˆ
ηj(pt − bs) if pt ≤ pˆ
rF j if pt > pˆ, pˇt ≤ pˆ
(89)
where pˇt = inf0≤k≤t{pt}.
The bankruptcy trigger pb is derived a usual by minimizing junior debt value J(pt, pˆ) =
Fj + (Pj,e(pb)−Fj)(pt/pb)λ (or by smooth-pasting J(pt) to Pj,e(pt) at pt = pb). This yields
either an interior optimum,
pb =
λ
λ− 1
F − γ(1− α)(1− ηj)
ηj(1− α) + α (r − µ)
or a corner solution, in which case junior face value is written down as soon as bankruptcy
starts and pb = pˆ.
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Classes vote simultaneously on all possible Nash bargaining 
allocations under the three possible impairment opportunities
*
:
e and j impaired, s unimpaired (e and j can vote, s not allowed)
e and s impaired, j unimpaired (e and s can vote, j not allowed) 
     all classes impaired  (all classes vote) 
rejection by at least 
one impaired class 
Equity-holder (e) makes a take-it or 
leave-it offer to creditors 
unanimous approval
*
Reorganization
plan implemented. 
no plan receives 
unanimous approval
*
unanimous approval
*
 of 
one bargaining 
allocation
**
Reorganization plan 
implemented 
Firm is liquidated. 
*
Unanimous approval means approval by impaired classes. Only impaired classes 
(impaired creditors and equity holders) are allowed to vote; unimpaired classes 
cannot vote. Impaired means that the cash flow the class receives deviates 
from the contractually specified coupon.
**
If more than one impairment opportunity is unanimously approved, the Court 
randomly selects one. 
Stage 1: 
In Chapter 11, the equity-
holder has, for a limited time, 
the exclusive right to make 
offers. We model this as a 
take-it or leave-it offer. If the 
offer is rejected, the game 
moves to a second stage.
Stage 2: 
After the equity-holder’s 
offer, any class can propose a 
plan. There is no agenda rule 
in the Code or time limits to 
the restructuring process. A 
plan must specify:  
1) which classes are impaired 
by the plan
*
;
2) the allocation of value 
amongst classes (with the 
constraint that unimpaired 
creditors  continue to receive 
their pre-bankruptcy contract). 
We model the allocation of 
value as Nash bargaining 
among impaired classes only.  
Figure 1: Extensive form game.
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ptp_ ps
** ps
* p j
*
Debt
Value
Fs
F j
g
P je( pt,ps* )
S( pt,ps* )
S( pt,ps** )
P je( pt,ps** )
Pse( pt,p j* ) Ps
J( pt,p j* )
P j
ptp_ ps
** ps
* p j
*
Equity
Value
Pe
Pes( pt,p j* )Pej( pt,ps* )
Pej( pt,ps** )
Figure 2: Debt values (top diagram) and equity values (bottom diagram) under the
different Nash-allocations when p∗j > p
∗
s. In the top diagram, Pj,e smooth pastes to
Pj at p
∗
s from above and Ps,e smooth pastes to Ps at p
∗
j from above. A sub-optimal
threshold level p∗∗s reduces the junior debt value Pj,e. Therefore, for any pt > p
∗
s
junior debt holders prefer to be impaired alone rather than jointly with senior debt
holders. In the bottom diagram, the equity value is highest when the junior class is
impaired first and the senior one is impaired along only when pt falls to a level p
∗
s. As
well as the junior debt, the equity value declines if the senior class is impaired jointly
with the junior at the sub-optimal threshold level p∗∗s (Pe,j(pt, p
∗
s) > Pe,j(pt, p
∗∗
s )).
Therefore, the equity holders agree with the junior class on a Nash-allocation (with
values {Pe,j, Pj,e, S(pt, p∗s)} to e, j and s respectively) which leaves the senior class
unimpaired for any pt > p
∗
s.
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ptp_ pbj
Coupon
bs
b j
bs( pt )
ps
*
b j( pt )
ptp_ pbjps
*
S, J
Fs
F j
g
P je( pt,ps* )
Ps
S( pt,ps* )
J( pt,pbj )
Figure 3: Equilibrium security values and coupons when p∗j > p
∗
s.
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b1=0.25 b2=0.3 b3=0.35
bs
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
CSs, CS j
CSs(b1)
CS j(b1)
CSs(b2)
CS j(b2)
CSs(b3)
CS j(b3)
Figure 4: Senior renegotiation premium. The renegotiation premium, rps is shown
as functions of the coupon bs ∈ [γr, b = 0.25] with the total coupon, b, held constant.
When the senior creditor is unimpaired, as in Panel A, the renegotiation premium can
be positive or negative. It is positive when the priority violation more than offsets the
benefits from collective renegotiation. If the senior creditor is impaired, as in Panel
B, the renegotiation premium is always negative. The vertical line between Panel A
and B corresponds to the level of bs such that both creditors are jointly impaired.
Baseline parameters are as follows: r = 0.06, µ = 0.02, σ = 0.15, ce = cs = cj = 1,
γ = 1 and α = 0.6.
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Panel A: p j
*
>ps
*
Junior creditor
restructured first
Panel B: pj
*
<ps
*
Senior creditor
restructured first
Renegotiation
premium 
Figure 5: Senior and junior credit spreads for different level of total face value. The
senior and junior credit spreads (CSs and CSj), as functions of bs, are evaluated at
different levels of total coupon b but at the same level of cash flows pt (so they are
directly comparable). The total coupon b takes values: b1 = 0.25, b2 = 0.30 and
b3 = 0.35.
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